

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF OCT. 16, 1974

(SALT TWO-473)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCT. 16, 1974.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 16, 1974

WE WILL STUDY YOUR STATEMENT OF TODAY WITH ALL THE
ATTENTION IT UNDOUBTEDLY DESERVES. WE WILL RETURN TO THE
QUESTIONS YOU RAISED AT A LATER TIME.

INTE THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSING APPROACHES OF PRINCIPLE
TO WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985,
TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS TWO QUESTIONS --
THAT WHICH THE U.S. SIDE CALLS "THROW-WEIGHT", AND MODERN-

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IZATION.

I

FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985 TO BECOME AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR CURBING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE AND FOR ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, IT MUST BE FULLY BASED ON TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND THE TOTALITY OF ALL THE FACTORS COMPRISING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

THIS MEANS THAT THE LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR IN THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST NOT BE BASED ON ARBITRARILY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHETHER IN QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE RESPECTS. OTHERWISE, THIS COULD LEAD TO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES BEING OBTAINED IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, WHICH WOULD BE UTTERLY CONTRARY TO THE NECESSITY OF RECOGNIZING THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY.

IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS THE QUESTION OF THE "THROW-WEIGHT" OF SO-CALLED "CENTRAL SYSTEMS" HAS BEEN RAISED. IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS PROPOSED THAT AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT COMPONENTS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT LIMITATIONS BE PLACED ON THE "THROW-WEIGHT" OF ICBM'S AND SLBM'S, WITH AN ACCOUNT FOR THE PAYLOAD OF HEAVY BOMBERS. THE "THROW-WEIGHT" OF MISSILES ALSO FIGURES IN PROPOSALS FOR LIMITATIONS ON MIRV'S.

SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF "THROW-WEIGHT" IS UNFOUNDED. WHEN THE SIDES ENTERED UPON THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN 1969, THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS THEIR ACTUAL STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS, WHICH IN THE USSR AND THE U.S. WERE DEVELOPING IN DIFFERENT WAYS DUE TO DIFFERENT TECHNICAL DECISIONS, A DISSIMILAR GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION, AND OTHER FACTORS. NEITHER SIDE CALLED INTO QUESTION THIS ASPECT OF THE MATTER. THE DESIRE WAS EXPRESSED TO LIMIT -- OR MORE PRECISELY "TO FREEZE" -- THE NUMBER OF HEAVY MISSILES, AND THE SOVIET SIDE, STRIVING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO AGREE TO CERTAIN MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PROVI-
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SIONS IN THIS REGARD. BUT, I REPEAT, NEVER WAS IT SUGGESTED THAT THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES BE MADE UNIFORM.

AND THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE. IT IS A MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THE U.S. HAS, FOR EXAMPLE, ONE TYPE OF ICBM'S WHICH ARE BEING MODERNIZED IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SOVIET UNION HAVE DIF-

FERENT CHARACTERISTICS. IT WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC TO ATTEMPT, WITH THE AID OF ONE OR ANOTHER ARBITRARILY SELECTED CHARACTERISTIC, TO EQUATE, MADE SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL, AN ASSORTMENT OF OBJECTS OR PHENOMENA THAT ARE SO DISSIMILAR, LET ALONE TO MEASURE OR BRING TO A COMMON DENOMINATOR, SO TO SPEAK, THE OBJECTIVELY EXISTING DIVERSE PROPERTIES OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. THIS WOULD NOT HELP BEING ABOUT A CONSTRUCTIVE AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESULT.

THE "THROW-WEIGHT" OF SO-CALLED "CENTRAL SYSTEMS" IS BY NO MEANS, AS IS SOMETIMES ATTEMPTED TO PRESENT IT, SOME SORT OF UNIVERSAL FORMULA FOR MEASURING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, SINCE IT DOES NOT EMBRACE THE WHOLE TOTALITY OF FACTORS DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE WEAPONS, AND COMPLETELY IGNORES THE PARTICULARS OF THEIR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

THIS RAISES THE QUESTION: FOR WHAT PURPOSE IS THIS CONCEPT BEING ADVANCED AT THE STAGE OF PREPARING THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985? REGRETTABLY, IF ONE LOOKS INTO THE MATTER, IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THIS WOULD LEAD TO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.

THE BIAS OF THIS APPROACH IS ESPECIALLY EVIDENT IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE PROPOSALS IT IS ENVISAGED TO LIMIT THE "THROW-WEIGHT" OF SO-CALLED "CENTRAL SYSTEMS" ONLY -- ICBM'S, SLBM'S AND HEAVY BOMBERS, I.E. THE "THROW-WEIGHT" CONCEPT IS APPLIED TO ONLY A PORTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

EVEN IF "THROW-WEIGHT" WERE TO BE DISCUSSED, THE LEGITIMATE QUESTION WOULD ARISE -- AND WE HAVE RAISED IT --
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CAN THE "THROW-WEIGHT" OF, FOR INSTANCE, HUNDREDS OF DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ON ATTACK CARRIERS BE EXCLUDED WHEN DETERMINING THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985? OF COURSE IT CANNOT. AFTER ALL, IN VIEW OF THE MANEUVERING CAPABILITIES OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, THE DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD THEM ARE CAPABLE OF DELIVERING CONSIDERABLE "THROW-WEIGHT" TO TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. THIS APPLIES IN EQUAL MEASURE TO U.S. FORWARD BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AS WELL.

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0116

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT PASS DOD

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CONCEPT OF LIMITING THE "THROW-WEIGHT" OF SO-CALLED "CENTRAL SYSTEMS", IN ITS STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF OCTOBER 4. WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT SUCH AN APPROACH DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FULLNESS OF THE OBJECTIVE PICTURE OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND LEADS AWAY FROM THE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO EMBODY IN THE NEW AGREEMENT THE MUTUALLY AGREED PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND IN ADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT IN CONSIDERING THE "THROW-WEIGHT" QUESTION, SUCH SYSTEMS AS FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD CARRIERS MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED WITHIN. THEREFORE, EVEN IF "THROW-WEIGHT" WERE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DISCUSSING APPROACHES TO WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT, IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR THE WHOLE TOTALITY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD CARRIERS. IN THIS CONNECTION THE MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD OF AIRCRAFT WOULD BE COUNTED AS THEIR "THROW-WEIGHT."

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ONE OF THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED IN DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY CONTENT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985 IS MODERNIZATION OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WOULD BE LIMITED UNDER THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT.

IT SEEMS THAT IN WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM THE SIDES COULD SUCCESSFULLY USE THE EXPERIENCE THEY ACCUMULATED IN THIS FIELD IN THE COURSE OF PREPARING AND CONCLUDING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN FORCE.

AS YOU KNOW, THE INTERIM AGREEMENT CONTAINED LIMITATIONS ON FIXED ICMB LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES. THESE LIMITATIONS APPLY TO BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASPECTS.

THERE IS ALSO A PROVISION IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT REGARDING MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. RECORDED IN ARTICLE IV OF THE AGREEMENT, IT IS THE RESULT OF A THOROUGH AND BALANCED TREATMENT OF THIS QUESTION. NOT MONTHS, BUT YEARS OF INTENSIVE WORK WERE DEVOTED TO THIS, WITH THE MILITARY AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS OF BOTH SIDES ALSO TAKING AN ACTIVE PART. AS A RESULT, WELL-FOUNDED AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WERE ARRIVED AT, WHOSE VIABILITY WAS FULLY CONFIRMED IN THE PROCESS OF BOTH SIDES CARRYING OUT THE OBLIGATIONS THEY HAD ASSUMED.

THAT PROVISION IS BASED ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF REALITY AND SERVES THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES, FOR IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO VISUALIZE THE NORMAL OPERATION, AND MAINTENANCE AT THE REQUIRED TECHNICAL LEVEL, OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CONSTRAINED, DURING THE MANY YEARS OF THE AGREEMENT'S DURATION, WITHOUT THEIR BEING MODERNIZED.

AT THIS PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIET SIDE HAS SUBMITTED A WHOLE SERIES OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS PROVIDING FOR LIMITATIONS OF A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE NATURE ON THOSE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. IN THEIR
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OOTALITY THEY WOULD CONSTITUTE A SYSTEM OF OFFENSIVE LIMITATIONS ON THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES, AND WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE MEASURE IN CURBING THE ARMS RACE. AND IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE FUTURE EFFORTS OF THE DELEGATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE FOCUSED ON CONFORMING THE SPECIFIC POSITIONS OF THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

AS FOR THE MODERNIZATION QUESTION, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT UNDER THE AGREEMENT IN FORCE THE SIDES CAN MODERNIZE THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SUBJECT TO THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THAT AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO RETAIN THE SAME PROCEDURE FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT AS WELL.

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